The Octopus Files
Sign up for Alpha access today

Iran-Contra affair: Reagan, North and the declassified records

454 documents · Counts as of Nov 21, 2026

Government records of the Iran-Contra affair, from White House files to the independent counsel’s final report.

TopicsPower & InfluenceSpying & Surveillance

On November 13, 1986, President Ronald Reagan said: “We did not -- repeat -- did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages” (doc iran-contra-reagan:IC-RR-40-643-55302807-R02-007-2022, p. 11). On March 4, 1987, he said: “A few months ago I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best intentions still tell me that’s true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not” (doc iran-contra-reagan:IC-RR-40-123-12011812-CFOA1132-042-2018, p. 17). Caspar Weinberger’s notes say he had told Reagan in 1985 the sales were “illegal” (doc iran-contra-walsh-evidence:IC-WALSHEV-EBB-OIC-05-Weinberger-notes-Dec-7-1985, p. 2). This cabinet holds 454 records of the Iran-Contra scandal, from White House files to the Walsh report.

Released by
The Reagan and Bush presidential libraries, the Senate Intelligence Committee, the President’s Special Review Board (the Tower Commission), Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh, the CIA and the FBI.
Released
Over several decades: the Tower Commission report on February 26, 1987, the Senate committee print in 1989, Walsh’s final report on January 18, 1994, and library and agency releases since.
What’s inside
454 records from 13,257 pages in nine sets: Reagan Library 289, Bush Library 29, Senate Intelligence Committee 1, Walsh Final Report 3, Walsh Internal Assessments 11, Walsh Evidence 8, Tower Commission 2, CIA 109 and FBI 2.
Our copy
Downloaded on November 9, 2026, from the libraries’ and agencies’ sites, the Internet Archive (CIA, FBI, Tower Commission and Walsh report copies) and the National Security Archive. The files are unchanged except five pages in four documents, where Social Security numbers were blacked out.
Supplements
None None. Every record is a government document; the Walsh internal assessments and evidence come from the National Security Archive’s published sets.

At a glance

Documents by yearNo dates in the catalog for these 454 documents.

What was the Iran-Contra affair all about?

Two secret Reagan administration operations, and the money that joined them. In Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh’s words, the Iran operation sought the release of Americans held hostage in the Middle East “through the sale of U.S. weapons to Iran, despite an embargo on such sales.” The Contra operation, from 1984 through most of 1986, was “the secret governmental support of contra military and paramilitary activities in Nicaragua, despite congressional prohibition of this support.” The two “were merged when funds generated from the sale of weapons to Iran were diverted to support the contra effort” (doc iran-contra-walsh:IC-WALSH-FINAL-V1, p. 15). Walsh dated the prohibition on aid to Contra military activities from October 1984 to October 1986 (p. 13).

Weinberger’s notes name the weapons discussed in December 1985: “Hawks + TOWs” (doc iran-contra-walsh-evidence:IC-WALSHEV-EBB-OIC-05-Weinberger-notes-Dec-7-1985, p. 2). How much money reached the Contras is not known exactly: because the funds were commingled, Walsh wrote, “it was not possible to determine precisely how much money was diverted.” He called the diversion “only one dimension of a much larger theft of Government funds generated by the Iran and Israeli-replenishment transactions” (doc iran-contra-walsh:IC-WALSH-FINAL-V1, p. 197).

How the Iran-Contra affair came out in 1986

Walsh’s report dates the unraveling to two events “thousands of miles apart.” On October 5, 1986, Nicaraguan government soldiers shot down an American cargo plane carrying military supplies to the Contras; the one surviving crew member, “American Eugene Hasenfus, was taken into captivity and stated that he was employed by the CIA.” A month later, on November 3, a Lebanese publication reported the arms sales to Iran (doc iran-contra-walsh:IC-WALSH-FINAL-V1, p. 15). Ten days later came Reagan’s denial, quoted above.

North testified that he assured Poindexter he had destroyed all documents relating to the diversion, the congressional report says, but it “nevertheless was discovered on November 22, 1986, when a Justice Department official, assisting the Attorney General’s fact-finding inquiry, found a ‘diversion memorandum’” (doc iran-contra-cia:IC-CIA-cia-rdp89t00142r000500610001-7, p. 27). On November 25, Attorney General Edwin Meese announced that “some of the proceeds from the Iran arms sales had been diverted to the contras” (doc iran-contra-walsh:IC-WALSH-FINAL-V1, p. 15).

The reversal came on March 4, 1987, six days after the Tower report. In the same address Reagan said: “As I told the Tower Board, I didn’t know about any diversion of funds to the Contras. But as President, I cannot escape responsibility” (doc iran-contra-reagan:IC-RR-40-123-12011812-CFOA1132-042-2018, p. 17; Reagan Library text ↗).

What the official investigations concluded

InvestigationReportWhoOn the President
Tower Commission (President’s Special Review Board)February 26, 1987John Tower, with Edmund Muskie and Brent ScowcroftNo evidence he knew of the diversion before November 25, 1986
Senate and House Iran-Contra committeesNovember 1987One joint report“The ultimate responsibility” rests with him
Independent CounselSubmitted August 5, 1993Lawrence E. Walsh, appointed December 19, 1986Criminal knowledge not provable; he “created the conditions” for others’ crimes

The Tower Commission. President Reagan’s own review board (doc iran-contra-walsh:IC-WALSH-FINAL-V1, p. 494) found that the National Security Council process “did not fail, it simply was largely ignored” (doc iran-contra-tower:IC-TOWER-President-s-Special-Review-Board-Tower-Commission, p. 51). On the diversion, it recorded that the President said he knew nothing of it before Meese told him: “No evidence has come to light to suggest otherwise.” It also wrote that North “turned to the private network that was already in place to run the Contra support operation,” a network “under the direction of Mr. Secord” (p. 38).

The congressional committees. Their joint report found that “the common ingredients of the Iran and Contra policies were secrecy, deception, and disdain for the law” (doc iran-contra-cia:IC-CIA-cia-rdp89t00142r000500610001-7, p. 27). It named Lt. Col. Oliver North the central figure “at the operational level,” acting with “the express approval” of Admiral John Poindexter (p. 36), and concluded: “If the President did not know what his National Security Advisers were doing, he should have” (p. 37).

The Walsh report. Walsh’s overall conclusion was that “high-ranking Administration officials violated laws and executive orders in the Iran/contra matter” (doc iran-contra-walsh:IC-WALSH-FINAL-V1, p. 13). He reported that Reagan, Vice President George Bush and other senior officials knew of the Iran operations; “of these officials, only Weinberger and Shultz dissented from the policy decision, and Weinberger eventually acquiesced by ordering the Department of Defense to provide the necessary arms” (p. 14). On the President, Walsh concluded that “it could not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that President Reagan knew of the underlying facts of Iran/contra that were criminal or that he made criminal misrepresentations regarding them,” but that he “created the conditions which made possible the crimes committed by others” (p. 471). Reagan’s lawyers called that last conclusion “the false and wholly unwarranted slander” (doc iran-contra-walsh:IC-WALSH-FINAL-V3, p. 716).

Who was charged, from Oliver North to Caspar Weinberger

Fourteen people were charged. Eleven were convicted at trial or pleaded guilty, and two of those convictions were overturned on appeal. Two were pardoned before trial, and one case was dismissed when the Bush Administration declined to declassify information needed for trial (doc iran-contra-walsh-evidence:IC-WALSHEV-EBB-OIC-01-Summary-of-Prosecutions, p. 1; OIC summary ↗). Walsh’s report lists all fourteen (doc iran-contra-walsh:IC-WALSH-FINAL-V1, pp. 14–15):

  • Oliver North, NSC staff: convicted by a jury in May 1989 on three charges; the conviction was vacated on appeal in July 1990 and the case dismissed in September 1991 (doc iran-contra-walsh-evidence:IC-WALSHEV-EBB-OIC-01-Summary-of-Prosecutions, p. 2).
  • John Poindexter, national security adviser: found guilty in April 1990 on five counts; the convictions were reversed in November 1991 (p. 2). Both rulings concerned whether their immunized testimony to Congress had influenced trial witnesses.
  • Robert McFarlane, Elliott Abrams and Alan Fiers Jr.: pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress.
  • Richard Secord: pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress. Albert Hakim: pleaded guilty to supplementing North’s salary. Carl Channell and Richard Miller: pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States. Thomas Clines: convicted of four tax counts for failing to report income from the operations.
  • Clair George, CIA: convicted of false statements and perjury before Congress.
  • Caspar Weinberger and Duane Clarridge: indicted, then pardoned before trial.
  • Joseph Fernandez, CIA: case dismissed when Attorney General Richard Thornburgh refused to declassify information needed for his defense.

On December 24, 1992, President George H. W. Bush pardoned Weinberger, Clarridge, George, Abrams, Fiers and McFarlane (doc iran-contra-walsh-evidence:IC-WALSHEV-EBB-OIC-01-Summary-of-Prosecutions, p. 1). Walsh notes that the Weinberger pardon “pre-empted a trial in which defense counsel indicated that they intended to call Bush as a witness” (doc iran-contra-walsh:IC-WALSH-FINAL-V1, p. 18).

Example finds

  1. Weinberger’s notes of the December 7, 1985 meeting. Weinberger wrote that he argued the embargo made arms sales to Iran illegal and that “washing” them through Israel “wouldn’t make it legal,” and that the President said “he could answer charges of illegality but he couldn’t answer charge that ‘big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages.’”Walsh evidence, Weinberger notes · doc iran-contra-walsh-evidence:IC-WALSHEV-EBB-OIC-05-Weinberger-notes-Dec-7-1985, p. 2 · National Security Archive PDF ↗
  2. The White House memo on what was said at that meeting. A July 20, 1987 memo to Howard H. Baker Jr. lists the President as present “in pajamas and a bathrobe.” It relays a State Department note of Weinberger’s recollection: Americans “would not understand it if four hostages died because he refused to break the law,” “they” could impeach him, and “visiting hours in prison were on Thursdays.” The memo says positions were stated “obviously with hyperbole,” and that such notes “should not be turned over to Congressional Committees.”Reagan Library, Iran-Contra hearings files · doc iran-contra-reagan:IC-RR-40-27-6912132-003-004-2017, pp. 3–5 · Reagan Library PDF ↗
  3. The diversion memo. North’s April 1986 plan “Release of American Hostages in Beirut” proposed that “$12 million will be used to purchase critically needed supplies for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance Forces” from the “residual funds from this transaction.” The Tower Board wrote that no evidence had emerged that it was ever placed before Poindexter or the President. In this cabinet’s Reagan Library folder, a March 31, 2014 withdrawal sheet lists a copy as withheld as national security classified information.Congressional report, ch. 12 · doc iran-contra-cia:IC-CIA-cia-rdp89t00142r000500610001-7, p. 241; Tower report, doc iran-contra-tower:IC-TOWER-President-s-Special-Review-Board-Tower-Commission, p. 38; withdrawal sheet, doc iran-contra-reagan:IC-RR-40-123-12011812-CFOA1130-074-2018, p. 8 · CIA release PDF ↗ · The memo ↗
  4. “I really didn’t want to know.” White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan told the Tower Board that on November 24, 1986 he asked Poindexter whether he knew of North’s role in the diversion. In Regan’s account, Poindexter replied: “I had a feeling that something bad was going on, but I didn’t investigate it and I didn’t do a thing about it. * * * I really didn’t want to know. I was so damned mad at Tip O’Neill for the way he was dragging the Contras around I didn’t want to know what, if anything, was going on. I should have, but I didn’t.”Tower Commission report · doc iran-contra-tower:IC-TOWER-President-s-Special-Review-Board-Tower-Commission, p. 38 · Internet Archive ↗
  5. Bush’s diary, November 5, 1986. In an entry on news about the hostages and McFarlane’s time in Iran, the Vice President recorded: “I’m one of the few people that know fully the details, and there is a lot of flack and misinformation out there. It is not a subject we can talk about.” Walsh’s office learned only in December 1992 that Bush had not produced the diary, despite requests in 1987 and early 1992.Walsh evidence, Bush diary extracts · doc iran-contra-walsh-evidence:IC-WALSHEV-EBB-OIC-06-Bush-Diary-11-4-86-pdf, p. 1; Walsh report, doc iran-contra-walsh:IC-WALSH-FINAL-V1, p. 18 · National Security Archive PDF ↗

Declassified Iran-Contra documents in this cabinet

One of the site’s power and influence cabinets, it puts the official record in one place: the Tower report; the November 1987 congressional report, in a CIA copy marked approved for release on May 25, 2011 (doc iran-contra-cia:IC-CIA-cia-rdp89t00142r000500610001-7, p. 1), from the archive also searchable in CIA CREST; the Walsh report and evidence from Walsh’s office; and Reagan Library files. Walsh’s report notes “a third classified volume that remains under seal” (doc iran-contra-walsh:IC-WALSH-FINAL-V1, p. 2), and Reagan Library withdrawal sheets mark copies withheld when folders were processed.

How to search the Iran-Contra files here

Sign up for the alpha. Once your invite arrives, open the Iran-Contra cabinet, or tick it with any other cabinets, and search by exact words, with AND, OR and NOT, or by meaning, to find passages about an idea even when the words differ. Try “diversion memorandum”, “Boland” or “HAWK”. Ask Octopus can also answer a question in plain English, with citations to the records.

Related cabinets: INSLAW and its records page on Danny Casolaro; CIA CREST, the CIA’s own declassified archive; and every cabinet about power and influence or spying and surveillance.

Questions about the Iran-Contra affair

Was President Reagan charged in the Iran-Contra affair?

No. Walsh concluded that it could not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Reagan knew the underlying criminal facts or made criminal misrepresentations about them (doc iran-contra-walsh:IC-WALSH-FINAL-V1, p. 471). Reagan said he did not know of the diversion.

Did George H. W. Bush know about Iran-Contra?

Walsh found that Bush was “fully aware of the Iran arms sales” but obtained no evidence that he knew of the diversion, and did not develop evidence that proved he violated any criminal statute (doc iran-contra-walsh:IC-WALSH-FINAL-V1, p. 18). The congressional committees also found no evidence that the Vice President was aware of the diversion (doc iran-contra-cia:IC-CIA-cia-rdp89t00142r000500610001-7, p. 37).

How much money was diverted to the Contras?

The exact sum is not known, because the funds were commingled. For the period after direct U.S. arms sales to Iran began in February 1986, Walsh put the amount that could have been proved at trial at $3.6 million, and wrote that it “probably was at least $1.1 million more” (doc iran-contra-walsh:IC-WALSH-FINAL-V1, p. 197).

Who did President Bush pardon for Iran-Contra?

On December 24, 1992, Bush pardoned six people: Caspar Weinberger and Duane Clarridge, who were awaiting trial, and Clair George, Elliott Abrams, Alan Fiers Jr. and Robert McFarlane, who had been convicted or had pleaded guilty (doc iran-contra-walsh-evidence:IC-WALSHEV-EBB-OIC-01-Summary-of-Prosecutions, p. 1).

Were Oliver North’s convictions overturned?

Yes. A jury convicted North on three counts in May 1989. An appeals panel vacated the conviction in July 1990, and in September 1991, after hearings on whether his immunized testimony to Congress influenced trial witnesses, the court dismissed the case (doc iran-contra-walsh-evidence:IC-WALSHEV-EBB-OIC-01-Summary-of-Prosecutions, p. 2).

What was the Boland Amendment?

Limits Congress put on U.S. aid to the Contras. The first, passed December 21, 1982, barred the Defense Department and the CIA from spending funds to overthrow Nicaragua or provoke conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras. On October 3, 1984, it cut off funding and barred agencies “involved in intelligence activities” from directly or indirectly supporting military operations there; whether that covered the NSC staff was disputed (doc iran-contra-tower:IC-TOWER-President-s-Special-Review-Board-Tower-Commission, pp. 38–39). Walsh did not charge Boland violations, because they “are not criminal statutes” (doc iran-contra-walsh:IC-WALSH-FINAL-V1, p. 14).

Background drawn from each release’s official pages and our intake records, written November 10, 2026; counts in the facts above are from that day. The guide draws on the official release pages and on the records in this cabinet, checked November 21, 2026; its cabinet count is from the archive as of November 21, 2026.

Sign up for Alpha access today